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In 1989 a Virginia jury sentenced Dennis Wayne Eaton to death for the
capital murder of a state trooper His death sentence rested entirely on a
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if not sentenced to death "there [was]
a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society."2 Despite the jury's deter-
mination that Eaton would be violent again, he was by all accounts a model
death-row inmate. At the time of his execution in 1998, Eaton's prison record
showed only one minor rule violation and not even a hint of violent behavior.'
Had the jury known, at the time of his sentencing, that the next eight years of
Eaton's life would include a virtually spotless prison record, it is unlikely that
they would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he would pose a serious
threat of violence to others. In other words, it is highly probable that Dennis
Eaton was sentenced to death by mistake.
The Dennis Eaton story is not unusual. Although capital jurors regularly
determine that capital offenders will be violent again if not sentenced to death,
these predictions almost never come true.4 In fact, jurors substantially over-
estimate the prevalence of serious violence in prison.' The importance of these
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Washington and Lee University School of Law; A.B., Harvard
University,June 2000. I thank Professor David Bruck for his insight and patience and the members
of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, especially Maxwell Smith, my editor. I also thank
Professor David Super for his invaluable guidance over the last year and, of course, my family for
their constant support.
1. Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385, 387, 390 (Va. 1990).
2. Id. at 398; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (setting forth Virginia's
statutory aggravating factors, one of which must be found by a capital jury beyond a reasonable
doubt prior to the imposition of a sentence of death).
3. In November 1993 Eaton failed to enter his cell in a timely manner as instructed.
Telephone interview with Ross S. Haines, counsel for Dennis Eaton (Mar. 2, 2005).
4. See infra notes 49-63, 118-20 and accompanying text (noting the actual prevalence of
homicide and assaultive behavior in prison).
5. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing a Texas study in which capital
jurors grossly over-estimated the likelihood that capital offenders would commit future acts of
violence).
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predictive errors is clear in a state like Virginia, which relies heavily on future
dangerousness determinations in capital sentencing.6
This article will look at how future dangerousness findings are made in
Virginia to see if these predictive errors can be avoided. The article first surveys
basic risk-assessment tools available to assist jurors in making future dangerous-
ness determinations and contrasts this assessment with what actually occurs in
Virginia capital sentencing hearings. Next, because of the limitations of the
currently admissible future dangerousness evidence in Virginia-particularly
extrapolations from prior conduct in free society and clinical predictions by
mental health experts-the article suggests that the capital sentencing proceeding
in Virginia raises constitutional concerns. Those concerns can be minimized if
juries are provided with certain core information regarding the nature of prison
life and the statistical prevalence of prison violence. With this evidence, and
assisted by informed mental health expert testimony, jurors can make a more
reliable determination that a particular defendant will be violent in prison. The
goal is to develop a capital sentencing proceeding that makes what happened to
Dennis Eaton the exception rather than the rule.
II. Violence Risk Assessment in Capital Sentencing in Viginia
Virginia's capital sentencing scheme includes only two statutory aggravating
circumstances, vileness and future dangerousness.7 The future dangerousness
inquiry asks capital jurors to decide whether "there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society."' The naive observer walking into a Virginia
courtroom prior to a capital sentencing, and knowing only this statutory lang-
uage, would assume that the sentencing jury was about to make a prediction
regarding the probability that this defendant would be violent again if not
sentenced to death. Specifically, our observer would surely suppose that to equip
the jury adequately to assess the chance that the defendant would actually
commit serious violent crimes, the evidence would provide the answers to at
least the following questions. Where will the defendant be incarcerated? Under
what conditions? How effectively has this type of incarceration prevented
recurrences of violence in the past? The process of answering these questions
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (setting forth Virginia's two statutory
aggravating factors, vileness and future dangerousness, one of which must be found by a capital jury
beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the death penalty to be imposed).
7. See id. (prohibiting a jury from imposing a sentence of death in a capital murder case
unless it finds "a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for




and determining the likelihood of future violent behavior is what social scientists
term "risk assessment."9
A. FouroQuestions of Consequence
The naive observer's questions are among the inquiries that John D.
Monahan, a leading expert in the risk-assessment field, posited as critical to any
risk determination.'" Monahan argued that the accuracy and precision of
violence risk assessment increased with the consideration of certain fundamental
questions." Applying this framework to risk assessment in capital cases, forensic
psychologists Mark D. Cunningham and Thomas J. Reidy distilled Monahan's
inquiries to four questions that frame an assessment of the likelihood of future
danger: What type of violence? Of what severity? At what time? In what
context?
2
In Virginia, statutory language and the 1995 abolition of parole have
substantially narrowed these inquiries. First, the future dangerousness
aggravating factor specifies that the future violence must be both "criminal" and
"serious."' 3  This specification of violence type is important because mild
incidents of violence generally occur with much greater frequency than severe
violence. 4 Further, because capital offenders are no longer eligible for parole or
geriatric release, the violence must be committed behind prison walls.'" Thus,
the type and severity of violence with which the inquiry is concerned is, as a
practical matter, confined to serious institutional violence. As Monahan pointed
9. See Dale E. McNiel et al., Risk Assessment, in 14 TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 147 (James R. P. Ogloff ed., 2002) (defining risk assessment as "the
process of understanding hazards to minimize their negative consequences").
10. JOHN D. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL
TECHNIQUES, 145-59 (1981).
11. Id.
12. Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Integrating Base Rate Data in Violence Risk
Assessments at Capital Sentencing 16 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 71, 74-76 (1998).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004).
14. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 74; see Randy K. Otto, On the Abi'y of Mental
Health Professionals to 'Prerict Dangerousness". A Commentagy on Interpretations of the 'Dangerousness"
Literature, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 52-53 (1994) (stating that the "adoption of broader
definitions of violence results in higher accuracy rates").
15. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(a) (Michie 2004) (authorizing punishment of death or life
imprisonment for Class 1 felonies committed by offenders above the age of sixteen who are not
determined to be mentally retarded); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie 2004) (listing the offenses
that constitute capital murder and therefore, are punishable as a Class 1 felonies); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-40.01 (Michie 2002) (prohibiting geriatric release for Class 1 felons convicted of offenses
committed on or afterJanuary 1,1995); VA. CODEANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2002) (providing that
"[a]ny person sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after
January 1, 1995, shall not be eligible for parole upon that offense").
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out, "[o]ne cannot even hope to predict what has not been defined. Some
specification of a criterion.. . is essential if prediction is to succeed."' 6
Second, Virginia's abolition of parole implicitly defined the relevant time
period as the capital life term, the natural life of the capital life inmate. 7 Future
dangerousness risk assessments take time period into account because research
has consistently demonstrated that rates of violence decrease with the age and
maturation of the inmate and with the length of incarceration.'8 For example,
a 1996 comparative study of Missouri capital and noncapital murder inmates
found that younger inmates committed a greater number of assaultive
disciplinary infractions and that the rate of those infractions tended to decrease
with the passage of time."
9
Finally, the Virginia General Assembly has indirectly specified the environ-
ment into which a life-sentenced capital offender is placed. 0 Given that no
capital murderer can ever be paroled, the relevant context is Virginia's maximum
security prisons.2 ' Notably, studies have shown that rates of serious criminal
violence in prison are much lower than in the general community, particularly
when rates are adjusted to mirror the prison population in terms of gender, age,
and ethnicity.' This discrepancy between the rates of violence in prison and
16. MONAHAN, supra note 10, at 58 (emphasis omitted). "Although ultimately it is the jury's
role to determine what exactly constitutes acts of criminal violence, at a minimum it would seem
that examiners should clarify the types of outcomes to which they are referring when describing the
likelihood of 'future violence.' " John F. Edens et al., Predhctions of Future Dangerousness in Capital
Murder Trials: I  it Time to 'Disinevent the Wheel?" 29 LAw & HUMAN BEHAv. 55, 76 (2005).
17. Because capital defendants are not eligible for parole, they are effectively sentenced to
die in prison. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (eliminating parole for defendants convicted of
felony offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995). But see Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537
S.E.2d 866, 878 (Va. 2000) (rejecting the defendant's "death in prison" closing argument because
defendants sentenced to life without parole are eligible for executive clemency).
18. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 82-86; Mark D. Cunningham & ThomasJ. Reidy,
Don't Confuse Me with the Facts: Common Erros in Violence Risk Assessment at Capital Sentening 26
CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV. 20, 31-32 (1999) (citing Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the
Explanation of Crme, 89AM.J. Soc. 552,565 (1983) (stating that "[t]he empirical fact of a decline in
the crime rate with age is beyond dispute")); see ako Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An
Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence Posed ?y CapitalMurder Defendants, 90 J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1251, 1256 (2000) (noting "an inverse relationship between sentence length or time served and
disciplinary infractions" and stating that the same correlation applies to studies of assaultive
behavior). "As in free society, age has been found to be the major determinant of rule-violating
behavior in prison." Id. at 1257.
19. Jonathan R. Sorensen & Robert D. Wrinkle, No Hope for Parok: Discipinagy Infractions
Among Death-Sentenced and Life- Without-Parok Inmates, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 542, 550 (1996).
20. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (eliminating parole for defendants convicted of felony
offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995).
21. For a brief introduction to the corrections institutions in Virginia by security level see
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECrIONS, INSTITUTIONAL ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA (2005), at
http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/facilities/institutions/insti-security.htm (last visited Mar. 19,2005).
22. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 25.
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community results because factors that correlate to a risk of violence in society
at large do not necessarily correlate in the same manner to a risk of violence in
prison.23  For example, as many as 47% of state prison inmates are serious
violent felons and as many as 75% suffer from Antisocial Personality Disorder
(ASPD).24 Accordingly, based solely upon defendants' histories of violence in
the community and the very high incidence of ASPD among prison inmates, a
correspondingly high rate of prison homicide might be predicted.25 In fact,
however, murder rates in prison are far below that in the community at large.26
Quite simply, putting "violent" people in prison makes them, on average,
much less violent, at least if violence is defined as the actual probability of violent
conduct (as opposed to an inchoate tendency to become violent under future
circumstances that will never in fact occur). As a National Institute of Corr-
ections study noted, "the placement of the inmate in a more secure environment
... served to suppress the inmate's expected misconduct record., 27 That finding
supports the commonsense proposition that the supervision, isolation, structure,
and severe restrictions of prison life limit rates of violence within the prison
institution." In addition, preventative measures such as lock down, isolation,
and shackled movement reduce and counter the opportunity for violence toward
others.29 In short, context matters because institutional violence is necessarily
related to the conditions of incarceration.30 Individuals " 'are never dangerous
in toto.'" 3 1 For these reasons, it would be an error to assume that acts of serious
23. Id.
24. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 75; Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 25.
25. See McNiel et al., supra note 9, at 149-50 (discussing the association between mental
disorder and violence and concluding that "the current prevailing view in psychology is that there
is a statistically significant relationship between violence and mental illness, but that the size of the
association is modest"). As this article discusses, the security features of prisons are designed to,
and do, minimize the risk that inmates with mental disorder will commit violent acts while incarcer-
ated.
26. Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1256 (citing Wendy P. Wolfson, The Deterrent Effect
of the Death Penaly upon Prison Murder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 159 (Hugo A. Bedau
ed., 3d ed. 1982)).
27. JACKALEXANDER &JAMES AUSTIN, U.S. DEP'r OFJUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR EVALUAT-
ING OBJECTIVE PRISON CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 76 (1992), http://www.nicic.org/library/-
010675.
28. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 25.
29. Id. at 32-33; see Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 77-78 (noting studies that indicate
that increased restriction, supervision, and isolation negate aggressive behavior).
30. Edens et al., supra note 16, at 79.
31. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 75 (quoting HAROLD V. HALL & RONALD S.




violence as seen in society will also be observed in the community that lives
behind bars.32
B. The Critical Role of Base Rates
Informed by the above considerations, the same observer might pose
another question: how often do capital murderers commit serious acts of violence
once they get to prison? The answer to this question is a risk assessment tool
called the base rate.33 The base rate is the statistical prevalence or frequency of
a particular behavior over a set period of time.34 For example, if one in one
hundred prison inmates takes literacy courses in prison, the statistical prevalence
of participation is 1%. Monahan described this statistical tool as "the most
important single piece of information necessary to make an accurate
prediction."35
Assessments conducted by the automobile insurance industry provide a
useful illustration of the application of base rates to risk determinations.36
Insurance companies engage in estimations of risk to determine the probability
that an individual will cause damage to his/her insured automobile.37 First, a
company identifies the characteristics of the relevant population-say,
seventeen-year-old males.3" The company then looks at this group's history of
accidents to determine how much seventeen-year-old males have cost them in
the past.39 From that information it determines a base rate or historic percentage
of accident costs for that group, say $700 per month per person.' That base rate
is then adjusted for context.4" For example, seventeen-year-old males who drive
in a city may have cost the company more than have seventeen-year-old males
who drive in a rural community.42 Finally, the base rate might be adjusted
slightly to take into account individual characteristics of the person insured (such
as scholastic achievement) and individual preventative measures (such as
participation in driver's education).4" Without base rates, insurance companies
32. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 25.
33. MONAHAN, supra note 10, at 60 (emphasis omitted).
34. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 73.
35. MONAHAN, supra note 10, at 60.
36. Record at 62-64, United States v. Beckford (E.D. Va. 1997) (No. 3:96CR66) (on file with
author).




41. Id. at 62-63.
42. Record at 62-63, Beckford (No. 3:96CR66) (on file with author).
43. Id. at 64.
[Vol. 17:2
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could not accurately assess the likelihood that a particular driver will incur
damage resulting in cost to the company.
The same procedural framework can be applied to estimate the probability
of violence in prison." The evaluator first determines with what frequency
capital offenders are violent in a particular prison environment.45 The resulting
percentage, the base rate, is then adjusted for specific context.' For example,
the rate might be adjusted for the level of prison security or isolation.47 Finally,
as in the insurance example, the base rate is particularized or adjusted for
individual characteristics such as age, history of prior adjustment to prison life,
and the nature of any previous incidents of violence in prison.
48
Empirical studies provide some indication of the yearly rate of assaultive
behavior and repeat murder in prison. For example, in 1996,Jonathan Sorensen
and Robert Wrinkle reported that 80% of murderers imprisoned in Missouri
committed zero acts of violence over a fifteen-year period, regardless of whether
they were sentenced to death, life without parole, or life with the possibility of
parole.49 Other studies indicate that the yearly rate of repeat murder in prison
is 0.002 or less.' This result does not change when capital life inmates and
death-sentenced capital murderers are placed in the same prison population or
when the inmates studied are death-sentenced offenders whose sentences have
been commuted to life imprisonment.5" A 2000 study by Sorensen and Pilgrim
of capital murder defendants in Texas found that over a forty-year period, the
44. Id. at 63-65.
45. Id. at 63.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id.
48. Record at 65, Beckford (No. 3:96CR66) (on file with author); see Cunningham & Reidy,
supra note 12, at 87-91 (discussing the individualization of base rates and concluding that individual-
ization is appropriate only when conducted conservatively and when reliable indicators are present
to support a conclusion "that the individual varies significantly from the comparison group"). A
number of risk-assessment methodologies incorporate individualized base rate data. Id. at 73-74.
In 1981 Monahan recommended approaching risk assessment by establishing a base rate and then
performing a conservative individualization of that rate. Id. at 73 (citingMONAHAN, supra note 10).
Ralph C. Serin and Nancy L. Amos proposed a "decision tree" approach to risk assessment that
involved four steps including the determination of a base rate estimate and a conservative revision
of that rate based upon individual characteristics of the defendant. Id. at 74 (citing Ralph C. Serin
& Nancy L. Amos, The Role of Pycbopatby in the Assessment ofDangerousness, 18 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIA-
TRY 231, 231-38 (1995)).
49. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 24 (discussing Sorensen & Wrinkle, supra note 19,
at 542-52).
50. Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1256 (citing Wolfson, supra note 26, at 168).
51. Id. (citing Sorensen & Wrinkle, supra note 19, at 548; James W. Marquart & Jonathan R.
Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Sodetyfrom Capital
Offenders, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 5, 19-21 (1989)) (finding that, among the inmates studied, "most
serious infractions were one-time events or situations').
2005]
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likelihood of a repeat murder by a life-sentenced capital murderer was 0.2% or
one in 500.2 The risk of assaultive behavior over the same forty-year period was
approximately 16%, or one in seven.
53
Another smaller Texas study followed 155 inmates against whom the
prosecution presented expert predictions of future dangerousness.54 Eight of the
155 inmates, or 5%, engaged in seriously assaultive behavior.S Thirty-one
inmates, or 20%, had no disciplinary record at all. 6 The remaining 75% percent
committed infractions that did not rise to the level of serious assaults.57 One
such inmate, Noble Mays, was executed on April 6, 1995, for a 1979 murder.5 "
After the sentencing jury determined that he presented a probability of serious
future violence "beyond a reasonable doubt," Mays spent fourteen years on
death row.5 9 During that time, he did not receive a single disciplinary infraction
for assaultive behavior.6"
These data illustrate an important but generally overlooked point: the
observed rates of in-prison murder and assault are drastically lower than those
predicted by capital jurors. In the same Texas study described above, Sorensen
and Pilgrim reported the results of interviews conducted with Texas capital
jurors.61 Jurors who sentenced defendants to death gave a median estimate of
85% percent for the likelihood that the defendant would commit a violent crime
and 50% for the likelihood that the defendant would commit another homicide
52. Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1269.
53. Id. Studies of prison violence have also determined that generally, a small group of
chronic offenders accounts for a comparatively large percentage of disciplinary infractions. See, e.g.,
Marquart & Sorensen, spra note 51, at 20 (finding that 7.4% of the Furman commuttees for whom
records were available were involved in more than half of the total rule violations).
54. TEX. DEFENDER SERVICE, DEADLY SPECULATION: MISLEADING TEXAS CAPITALJURIES
WITH FALSE PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS xiii-xiv (2004),
http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
55. Id. at 23.
56. Id. Because expert predictions of future dangerousness were made in each of these 155
capital cases, these same results indicate that the mental health expert testimony was wrong 95%
of the time. Id.
57. Id. "[A]lthough violent acts that appeared to result in injury were rare, the occurrence
of 'minor' types of disciplinary infractions was comparatively commonplace." Edens et al., supra
note 16, at 63. However, it is unlikely that "capital jurors would believe that their charge to identify
inmates who would engage in 'serious acts of criminal violence' should encompass those inmates"
who engage in minor rule violations. Id.
58. TEX. DEFENDER SERVICE, supra note 54, at 32.
59. Id.
60. Id. Low base rates of violence among commuted capital offenders "contradict the
frequently made argument that the only reason death row inmates are nonviolent is that they hope
to receive a reprieve because of their good behavior." Edens et al., supra note 16, at 63.
61. Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1269.
[Vol. 17:2
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if sentenced to life imprisonment.62 The corresponding estimates by jurors who
sentenced defendants to life imprisonment were 50% and 25%.63 As
demonstrated, their estimates exaggerate the actual observed rate of such violent
behavior by as much as 100 times.
IlL Future Dangerousness in Virginia: What Jurors Hear and
Do Not Hear at Capital Sentending
Given the disparity between juror predictions and actual rates of prison
violence, the naive observer, sitting in the public section of a Virginia courtroom,
would expect to learn about the nature of prison confinement and statistical base
rates of prison violence as the proceedings sought to quantify the risk posed by
the convicted murderer. But our observer would be in for a surprise. The sen-
tencing proceeding that would play out before him would look nothing like the
risk assessment inquiry just described.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has mandated a markedly different
approach to answering the question whether "there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society." 64 In a series of capital cases, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has anchored the dangerousness inquiry almost entirely to the
circumstances surrounding the charged offense and the defendant's criminal
record as well as any prior unadjudicated misconduct. 6 In doing so, the court
has rejected as irrelevant evidence regarding the nature of prison life and prison
security for capital life inmates.66
A. What Virginia Juries May Consider on the Issue of Future Dangerousness
The Supreme Court of Virginia set the tone for the admissibility of evidence
to prove a defendant's future dangerousness in Smith v. Commonwealth.67 The
court noted that the purpose of the future dangerousness provision was "to
62. Id.
63. Id. Even when capital inmates have been released from prison, studies suggest that the
likelihood of repeat murder ranges from 0.1 to 7%, significantly lower than juror expectations for
recidivism in highly structured and secured prison environments. Id. at 1254-55.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004); see infra Part lII.A-B (discussing the future
dangerousness inquiry in Virginia, including that evidence which is admitted and that which is
rejected as irrelevant).
65. See infra Part III.A (analyzing the cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia has
substantially limited the future dangerousness determination to consideration of the circumstances
of the offense and prior history of the defendant).
66. See infra Part 1II.B (discussing the Supreme Court of Virginia's treatment of prison life
evidence, including testimony by corrections experts, penologists, and prison inmates).
67. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
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focus the fact-finder's attention onprior criminal conduct."6 Building on that
assertion, the court concluded that certain types of backward-looking evidence
were properly admissible and sufficient to prove future dangerousness.69 In
Smith, for example, the court determined that the existence of prior criminal
offenses alone was sufficient to create a reasonable likelihood that the capital
defendant would commit future violent acts.7" Accordingly, the court upheld
Smith's sentence based upon a prior criminal conviction for forcible rape,
bolstered by expert testimony that he might commit violent acts in the future.71
In dictum, the Smith court also suggested that " 'the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense of which [the defendant] is
accused' " would alone support a finding of future dangerousness. 72  More
recently, the court explicitly held that circumstances surrounding the offense can
provide sufficient grounds to support a future dangerousness finding.73 Taking
the next logical step, the court in Fgye v. Commonwealth74 expanded its
consideration of prior behavior to include unadjudicated acts of criminal
conduct.75 The court looked to Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 and concluded
that the statutory language contemplated the use of a defendant's " 'prior
68. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 150-51;seealsoClarkv. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 789-90 (Va. 1979) (finding
that the defendant's lack of remorse and prior felony conviction for "conspiracy to distribute
controlled drugs" supported a finding of future dangerousness).
72. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149 n.4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie Supp.
1978)).
73. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807,813 (Va. 1985); see also Wolfe v. Common-
wealth, 576 S.E.2d 471, 485 (Va. 2003) (stating that the defendant's acts in the crime for which he
was on trial were sufficient to support the jury's future dangerousness finding); Roach v. Common-
wealth, 468 S.E.2d 98, 112 (Va. 1996) ("WTlhis Court has recognized that the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the capital murder alone may be sufficient to support a finding of 'future
dangerousness.' "); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48,53 (Va. 1993) (finding that the facts
and circumstances surrounding a planned murder for hire were sufficient to support the trial court's
finding of future dangerousness). See general# Jason J. Solomon, A Quarter Century of Death: A
Symposium on Capital Punishment in Viginia since Furman v. Georgia: Future Dangerousness: Issues and
Anasis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 59-63 (1999) (discussing the proof of future dangerousness by
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense).
74. 345 S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1986).
75. Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267,283 (Va. 1986); seealsoPruettv. Commonwealth,
351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (Va. 1986) (supporting the notion that unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct
are relevant to the determination of a defendant's future dangerousness); Poyner v. Commonwealth,
329 S.E.2d 815, 828 (Va. 1985) (rejecting the defendant's challenge to the admission of prior
unadjudicated acts because the statutory scheme did not "restrict the admissible evidence to the
record of convictions"). But see Solomon, supra note 73, at 64-65 (arguing that this evidence
introduces uncertainty because "there is no way to know whether the alleged conduct ever oc-
curred" and "even if the alleged criminal conduct is proven to have occurred, there is no require-
ment that the Commonwealth prove that the defendant did it").
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history' " and not just his prior criminal convictions.76 Accordingly, prior
unadjudicated acts-in Fgye a purported prison escape plan for which the
defendant had never been tried or convicted-are properly admissible to show
that a defendant will pose a continuing serious threat to society in the future.77
B. What Virginia Juries May Not Consider in Assessing Future Dangerousness
In 1995 the Virginia General Assembly abolished parole for Class 1 felons,
which includes those convicted of capital murder.78 Thus, the capital offender
in Virginia today faces two possible sentences: death or life without the
possibility of parole.79 If not sentenced to death, the defendant is effectively
sentenced to die in prison. Accordingly, the only society to which the defendant
might realistically pose a future threat is prison society." Recognizing this
fundamental shift in the future dangerousness inquiry, Virginia capital defendants
have sought to introduce evidence, both as mitigation and in rebuttal to the
prosecution's allegations of dangerousness, that they would not pose a danger
to the prison society in which they would spend the remainder of their natural
lives.8' Virginia has rejected such evidence on both fronts.8"
76. Fgye, 345 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C)); see VA. CODE ANN.
19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2004) (stating that the death penalty "shall not be imposed unless the
Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence
of the prior hisbogy of the defendant or of the circumstances surroundng the commission of the offense of which be is
accused' that he would pose a future danger to society or that "his conduct in committing the
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile').
77. Fgye, 345 S.E.2d at 283. Under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:2, the Commonwealth
must inform a defendant that it will present evidence of unadjudicated criminal acts at sentencing.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 2004). However, "[t]his limitation has no effect on the
standard of proof, nor does it create any bar to admission unless the Commonwealth fails to inform
the defendant of its intention." Solomon, supra note 73, at 64-65 n.64; see, e.g., Walker v. Common-
wealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (Va. 1999) (rejecting the argument that unadjudicated acts of criminal
conduct must be proven to have occurred beyond a reasonable doubt).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2002). The General Assembly also eliminated
geriatric parole for all Class 1 felons. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1- 40.01 (Michie 2002). As a result,
defendants convicted of capital murder for offenses committed afterJanuary 1, 1995, are ineligible
for parole as a matter of law.
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2004) (providing that when a sentence of
death is not recommended by a capital jury, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01,165.1.
81. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text (analyzing the cases in which the Supreme
Court of Virginia rejected defendants' proffers of prison life evidence).
82. Other capital jurisdictions have considered and permit the introduction of prison life
evidence such as that currendy excluded in Virginia. See, e.g., United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d
803,821 (4th Cir. 2000) (admitting testimony by Dr. Mark Cunningham, a forensic psychologist and
risk assessment expert, that Barnette presented a low risk of committing further violent acts in
prison); United States v. Peoples, 74 F. Supp. 2d 930, 932-33 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (finding that
evidence of prison security statistics is admissible to challenge future dangerousness); People v.
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In Cherrix v. Commonwealth,83 the court upheld the exclusion of "prison life"
evidence offered in mitigation under the Eighth Amendment." Specifically,
Cherrix proffered the testimony of a penologist, a criminologist, a sociologist,
Virginia corrections officials, and an inmate serving a life sentence to show that
he would not pose a danger in prison.85 The trial court refused to admit any of
the testimony.8 6 On appeal, Cherrix relied on Skipperv. South CarolinaP7 in which
the United States Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of evidence that
the defendant had adjusted well to pretrial incarceration violated the Eighth
Amendment.88
In rejecting this argument, the Virginia court relied upon footnote twelve
of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Locket v. Ohio.89 After
establishing a general Eighth Amendment requirement that capital sentencing
juries consider any relevant evidence proffered by the defense as a basis for a
sentence less than death, the Lockett Court added that "[n]othing in this opinion
limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not
bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his
offense."9 The Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted this footnote to mean
that any evidence not relating directly to the "defendant's character, prior record,
or the circumstances of his offense" may properly be excluded.9' The court
found that the proffered evidence regarding the "general nature of prison life,"
Gallego, 802 P.2d 169, 186 (Ca. 1990) (allowing Dr. Craig Haney to testify regarding the prison
security the defendant would face if sentenced to life without parole); Pye v. State, 505 S.E.2d 4,
15 (Ga. 1998) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (noting that if the State presents an argument about the
defendant's threat to prison guards, sentencing will include witnesses to testify on such evidence
as "the defendant's probable behavior in prison, and corrections personnel to testify about security
in prisons holding inmates serving sentences of life or fife without parole"); c( State v. Thibodeaux,
750 So. 2d 916, 929 (La. 1999) (rejecting a defendant's objection to the State's prison life evidence
because "the defense first introduced detailed information about prison life through its 'corrections'
expert").
83. 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).
84. Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642,653 (Va. 1999); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality) (establishing an Eighth
Amendment right that capital juries must be able to consider, as mitigating evidence, any evidence
or circumstances of the accused's character or record that could result in a sentence less than death).
85. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653.
86. Id.
87. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
88. Cbemrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653; see Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (conclud-
ing that the exclusion of evidence of pretrial incarceration behavior violated Locket.
89. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653; see Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (stating that "[n]othing in this
opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on
the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense').
90. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12.
91. Cbeix, 513 S.E.2d at 653.
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as opposed to the specific evidence of the defendant's own prior jail behavior in
Skipper, did not pertain to the defendant's history and experience and therefore,
was inadmissible as mitigation evidence.92
Faced with the court's rejection of the Eighth Amendment mitigation
argument, defendant William Burns argued on appeal from a capital sentence
that evidence regarding prison life in a maximum security prison should be
admissible to rebut the Commonwealth's claim of future dangerousness.93 The
court gave three reasons for rejecting Burns's claim.94 First, the court relied on
its decision in Cherrix that evidence of the "general nature of prison life" is not
relevant to the individualized analysis required by the determination of a
particular defendant's future danger to society.9" Because the statutory language
focused "not [on] whether Burns could commit criminal acts of violence in the
future but whether he would," the court concluded that only evidence regarding
Burns's own history and circumstances of his offense was properly admissible.96
Second, the court rejected Burns's claim that "his proffered evidence should
have been admitted to dispel the misconception that prison life includes such
features as weekend furloughs, conjugal visits, and unrestricted work priv-
ileges."97 The court held that evidence of general prison life did not rebut any
corresponding evidence offered by the prosecution because the Commonwealth
had offered only evidence of the defendant's criminal acts and unadjudicated
conduct.9"
Finally, the court in Burns v. Commonwealth99 noted that it had previously
rejected the claim that the abolition of parole limited the statutory definition of
"society" to prison society, citing its earlier decision in Lovitt v. Commonwealth.1t°
92. Id.; see Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 574 (relying on Cherrix to prohibit testimony of the Chief
of Operations for the Virginia Department Corrections to attest to the nature of life imprisonment
in a maximum security facility without parole).
93. Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 892 (Va. 2001).
94. Burns, 541 S.E.2d at 893-94.
95. Id.
96. Id. This characterization fails to acknowledge that the two inquiries are interdependent.
See Sarah M. Braugh, Inconsistendes in Virnia CapitalJurisprudence, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 14-15 (2001)
(discussing the flawed logic of the Burns court's distinction between "could" and "would"). The
determination of whether a defendant would pose a serious threat in the future necessarily depends
upon whether he would actually have the opportunity to commit violent acts. Id.
97. Burns, 541 S.E.2d at 893.
98. Id. This determination by the Supreme Court of Virginia suggests that the defense can
offer in rebuttal only that evidence which is directly opposite to that offered by the Commonwealth.
For example, if the Commonwealth presented only circumstantial evidence to prove the identity
of the defendant, the defendant could likewise offer only circumstantial evidence in rebuttal. Such
a result would impermissibly hamper the presentation of the defense.
99. 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001).
100. Id. at 893; see Lomitt, 537 S.E.2d at 878-79 (rejecting the argument that the society in
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In Loiftt, the defendant argued that "the only relevant 'society' for the jury's
consideration of his 'future dangerousness' was prison society." '" Purporting
to engage in a plain meaning interpretation of Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2,
the court pointed out that the statutory language, "would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society," did not include words that limited the determination
of dangerousness to prison society in the case of the parole-ineligible
defendant. 1 2 Rather than "rewrite the statute to restrict its scope" so as to
accommodate Lovitt's assertion, the court instead read the statute to permit the
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant posed a
"probability" of serious violence to a community into which he would never, in
fact, be released.0 3
Notably, the court's rationale in Lovitt is at odds with its reasoning in
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth1°4 and Fisbback v. Commmonwealtb. °5 In Yarbrough, the
Supreme Court of Virginia mandated that, upon the defendant's request, the trial
court must instruct the jury that life imprisonment means life without parole."°
The court determined that, "without this knowledge the jury may erroneously
section 19.2-264.2 is limited to prison society). But see Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (recognizing that "society" encompasses prison society in addition to free society).
101. Lot'tt, 537 S.E.2d at 879.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court concluded, therefore, that prison life evidence was inadmissible and that
evidence of Lovitt's behavior while incarcerated for prior convictions was sufficient to uphold the
jury's determination that Lovitt would pose a threat to others in the future. Id.; see also Bell v.
Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 713 (Va. 2002) (relying on Cberrix and Burns and affirming the
denial of an expert "to assess [the defendant's] likelihood of being a future danger in prison, and
to testify concerning the correctional systems used in a maximum security prison to manage inmates
and prevent acts of violence"); Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d 186, 199 (Va. 2001)
(following Burns and rejecting evidence of prison life and security features of a maximum security
prison). See general# Sarah M. Braugh, supra note 96, at 14 (arguing that "it is error to interpret
'society' as encompassing both prison and non-prison populations" in light of the abolition of
parole in Virginia and because the court's interpretation of sections 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4, as
encompassing prison and non-prison society, results in a conflict with sections 53.1-165.1 and 53.1-
40.01 of the Virginia Code). See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (Michie 2002) (prohibiting geriatric
release for Class 1 felons convicted of offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2002) (providing that "[a]ny person sentenced to a term of incarceration
for a felony offense committed on or afterj anuary 1,1995, shall not be eligible for parole upon that
offense").
104. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
105. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629,633 (Va. 2000); seeYarbrough v. Common-
wealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999) (holding that Virginia capital defendants should receive an
instruction concerning their parole ineligibility regardless of the whether the charged death-
qualifying aggravator is vileness or future dangerousness).
106. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 616; seeVA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2004) (codifying
the Yarbrough rule and providing that, upon the defendant's request, the jury will be instructed that
the defendant shall not receive parole if sentenced to life in prison for a crime committed after
January 1, 1995).
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speculate" on that which is not subject to speculation, the possibility of parole,
and accordingly impose a sentence of death.10 7 The court elaborated on this
rationale in Fishback, which extended the requirement of a no-parole instruction
to non-capital felony sentencing proceedings."' 8 While imposing an obligation
to inform juries of the abolition of parole, the Fishback court considered and
rejected the Commonwealth's corollary request for a corresponding instruction
to the jury that defendants charged with non-capital felonies could reduce their
sentences by earning "good time."' 9 The court held that such good-time
instructions would invite pure speculation because at the sentencing proceeding,
the jury would never have a factual basis upon which to assess the likely effect
of possible future good behavior."0 Such speculation, the court concluded,
would not advance the desirable goal of "truth in sentencing.'
In reaching this conclusion, the court contrasted good time with the issue
of parole involved in Yarbrough."2 Specifically, the court noted that for those
defendants convicted of felony offenses committed after January 1, 1995, the
abolition of parole "leaves no room for speculation by a jury as to what might
occur thereafter during the executive department's administration of the
sentence imposed " because "[t]he executive branch no longer has the discretion
to grant or deny parole.""' 3 Thus, unlike the provisions for good behavior, the
court explicitly acknowledged that the capital life term is statutorily fixed and
definite to the extent that it would "def[y] reason" and "truth in sentencing" not
to instruct the jury of the defendant's parole ineligibility."' Despite this
reasoning, the same court in Lovitt interpreted section 19.2-264 to contemplate
the capital inmate's release into a society other than prison society."' That
interpretation, taken together with the court's rejection of prison life evidence,
reintroduced jury speculation that runs counter to the court's own "truth in
sentencing" rationale.
C. Etidence Not Yet Considered by the Supreme Court of ViTginia
Unlike the factually grounded risk assessment described in PartII, the future
dangerousness inquiry actually conducted by Virginia capital jurors consists
107. Yarbrougb, 519 S.E.2d at 615-16 (emphasis omitted).
108. Fishbak, 532 S.E.2d at 634 (Va. 2000).
109. Id. at 634-35.
110. Id. at 634.
111. Id. at 632.
112. Id. at 633.
113. Id.
114. Fishback, 532 S.E.2d at 633.
115. Lotit#, 537 S.E.2d at 879; see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing the
Lot'iu court's rejection of a claim that the abolition of parole limited the statutory definition of
society to prison society).
20051
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
primarily of an extrapolation from the circumstances of the murder and from the
offender's prior criminal conduct." 6 Absent objective information to the
contrary, Virginia jurors, like the jurors interviewed in Texas, would likely predict
a high rate of prison violence." 7 In fact, however, prison violence data, as
reported by the Virginia Department of Corrections, do not support such an
inference."' In 2003 the Department of Corrections statistical summary showed,
per thousand inmates, only 1.2 assaults on inmates requiring medical attention
and 0.5 assaults on staff requiring medical attention." 9 The corresponding rates
for prior years were 0.7 and 0.2 for 2002, 0.6 and 0.1 for 2001, and 0.9 and 0.03
for 2000.120 As yet, the Supreme Court of Virginia has not ruled on the
admissibility of such base rate evidence to provide a real-world foundation for
capital juries' assessments of the likelihood of future violence by capital
murderers.' 2'
116. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the Supreme Court of Virginia's future dangerousness
jurisprudence in which the court substantially limited the future dangerousness analysis to the
circumstances of the offense and the defendant's prior history).
117. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing a Texas study in which capital
jurors grossly over-estimated the likelihood that capital offenders would commit future acts of
violence).
118. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUMMARIES
(2000-2003), at http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/default.htm (last visited Mar.
19, 2005).
119. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY 6 (2003),
http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/stadstics/research/new-statsum/FY03-StatSummay.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
120. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY 6 (2002),
http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/research/new-statsum/FY0
2LStatSummary.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005); VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUMMARY 6 (2001), http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/research/new-statsum/
FY01_StatSummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005); VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY 6 (2000), http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/statistics/
research/new-statsum/FYOOStatSummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
121. Although base rate data has not been tested in the Supreme Court of Virginia, its
admissibility, as an evidentiary matter, is reasonably certain. In 1993 the Virginia General Assembly
enacted Virginia Code section 8.01-401.3, adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states that,
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the [uror] to understand the
evidence.. . , a witness qualified as an expert... may testify... if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts... , (2) the testimony is the product of reliable.., methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the.., methods reliably to the facts." FED. R. EVID. 702; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.3
(Michie 2004) (adopting the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 702); see also Mark D.
Cunningham and Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal Capital Sentencing: Individuai Za-
tion, GenerakZation, Relevance, and Scientific Standards, 29 CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV. 512, 517-33 (2002)
(analyzing issues of reliability and relevancy with respect to the admissibility of actuarial risk
assessments in federal capital sentencing proceedings).
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IV. The Case for Actuaial Risk Assessment at Capital Sentencing
A. The Limitations of Expert Testimony Absent Risk Assessment Tools
It would not be accurate, however, to argue that the Commonwealth has
never relied upon actual predictions of future danger to secure sentences of
death. In fact, Virginia courts have routinely admitted the testimony of mental
health professionals to aid the jury in its efforts to predict defendants' future acts
of violence." z In contrast to the quantitative assessments described above,
however, mental health experts have typically engaged in risk assessments by
relying primarily on subjective clinical assessments centered around the
individual client interview.12 3 Based upon that interview, a review of the client's
file and record, a comparison to similar cases, and a literature review, a
professional evaluator derives an estimate of risk.1
24
In the late 1970s, researchers began to question the ability of mental health
experts to predict future dangerousness accurately.2 5 Monahan surveyed the
"first generation" of risk assessments and concluded that psychiatrists and
psychologists correctly predict future violence in only one out of every three
cases.126 The work of Monahan and numerous other researchers led to a
widespread conclusion among the mental health and legal communities that
mental health professionals cannot reliably predict dangerousness. 2 1 Although
later works have reassessed and challenged the methodological limitations of the
first generation researchers' conclusions, the relevant literature generally supports
the notion that early clinical risk assessment techniques were, at best, slightly
better than chance at predicting future violence.1
8
122. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (discussing a number of Virginia cases in
which the Commonwealth relied upon the testimony of clinical forensic psychologists to predict
future dangerousness).
123. Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger The 'Fit" of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 15-16 (2003); see Caroline M. Mee & Harold V. Hall, Risky Business: Assessing
Dangerousness in Hawaii, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 63,90-93 (2001) (dividing the history of risk assessment
development into six stages and pointing to the mid-1990s as the time for the development of pure
actuarial measures followed by two additional stages of refinement).
124. Scherr, supra note 123, at 15-16.
125. See Otto, supra note 14, at 46 n.10 (listing early studies that examined the accuracy of
mental health predictions of violence).
126. Id. at 46 (citing MONAHAN, supra note 10).
127. Id. at 48-49. For a modem look at the medical ethics of predictions of future violence,
see Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is it Unethicalto OfferPredtions ofFuture Violence?, 16 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 621 (1992) and Thomas R. Litwack, On the Ethics of Dangerousness Assessments, 17
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 479 (1993). See also Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable of the Forensic Pychiatrist:
Ethics and the Problem ofDoing Harm, 13 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY 249,250-51(1990) (suggesting that
the ethical principles guiding forensic psychiatrists are necessarily different from those followed by
their clinical colleagues).
128. See Otto, supra note 14, at 51-63 (describing the methodological limitations of the first
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Nonetheless, in 1983, against the backdrop of the first generation research,
the United States Supreme Court decided Barefoot v. Estelle.129 Barefoot upheld
against Eighth Amendment challenge the admission of predictive expert
testimony regarding dangerousness for consideration in the sentencing phase of
a capital trial. 3° The evidence produced at sentencing in Barefoot consisted of
Barefoot's prior criminal record (two prior convictions for unlawful possession
of firearms and two convictions for prior drug offenses), evidence of his escape
from a New Mexico jail, several character witnesses, and finally, the testimony
of Drs. John Holbrook and James Grigson, both psychiatrists."' Neither
psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot.'3 2 Nonetheless, Dr. Grigson
testified that regardless of whether Barefoot was in society at large or in prison,
there was a "'one bundredperent and absolute' chance that [he] would commit future
acts of criminal violence.'
133
The Court recognized the potentially unreliable nature of this and similar
predictive testimony." 4 Nevertheless, the Court maintained that, through
effective cross-examination, "[p]sychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness
may be countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but as generally so
unreliable that it should be ignored."' 35 Thus, the Court presumed the ability of
the adversarial process to sort reliable from unreliable expert testimony.
136
generation research and discussing a "second generation" of research, which suggested that "mental
health professionals have some ability to assess risk and make predictions of violence (i.e., they do
better than chance)"); see also id. at 63 ("[W]hereas first generation research suggested that perhaps
one out of three people predicted to [commit violent acts] will actually .. .do so, more recent
studies suggest that one out of every two people predicted to be violent would go on to engage in
some kind of legally relevant, violent behavior."); Lisa M. Dennis, Constitutiona'ty, Accuray, Admissi-
bih: Assessing Expert Predictions ofFuture Vioknce in Capital Sentencing Prceedings, 10 VA.J. Soc. POLY
&L. 292,305-06 (2002) (discussing a "second wave" of clinical research on violence prediction that
eliminated many of the methodological errors of the early clinical predictions).
129. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
130. Id. at 905-06.
131. Id. at 917-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 917.
133. Id. at 919. Texas prosecutors regularly relied on the testimony of Dr. Grigson. Alan
Berlow, The WrongMan, THE ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Nov. 1, 1999, at 66-78,1999 WLNR 4438848.
Grigson became known as "Dr. Death" because his expert prediction of future dangerousness
contributed to 115 deaths in 124 capital cases. Id. In 1977 Grigson testified at the trial of Randall
Dale Adams where he stated, "There is no question in my mind that Adams is guilty" and "He
will kill again." Id. Adams, who was exonerated and released in 1989, "wasn't guilty then and hasn't
been in trouble since." Hugh Aynesworth, Texas 'Dr. Death "Retires after 167 Capital Case Trals, THE
WASHINGTON TIMEs, Dec. 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031220-113219-
5189r.htm.
134. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897-98.
135. Id. at 898.
136. Id. at 900-01. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, recognized an inherent limitation on the
ability of defense counsel to neutralize erroneous expert testimony through cross-examination.
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For the following reasons, the adversarial process cannot adequately
mitigate the effects of unreliable future dangerousness testimony in Virginia.
Because Virginia does not permit the introduction of prison life evidence, and
as yet has not ruled on the admissibility of base rate data, the defendant must
resort to a battle of the clinical experts. Accordingly, the jury must face a choice
between crediting the Commonwealth's expert, who claims to have detected a
high probability of future violence toward others, and the defense expert, who
claims otherwise.'37 If the jury gives credence to the Commonwealth's expert
testimony, they risk sentencing to death a capital murderer who may or may not
become a model prison inmate. On the other hand, if the jury relies upon the
testimony of the defense expert, they risk the possibilities that the
Commonwealth's predictions will materialize and the defendant will murder
again. Weighing those risks, jurors will naturally tend to discount the expert
testimony of the defense. In other words, jurors will err in favor of execution.
Despite widespread criticism of predictive testimony of the sort offered in
Barefoot, violence risk assessment errors continue at capital sentencing.'38 First,
without reference to base rate and contextual data, risk assessments are subject
to what researchers call "illusory correlation."'39 Illusory correlation results
"when an observer reports that a correlation exists between classes of events
which are not correlated, or correlated to a lesser degree, or are correlated in the
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun pointed out that
when a person's life is at stake-no matter how heinous his offense-a requirement
of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of a
psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable
untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself.
Id.; see Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scienffic Expert Testimony on Juror
Desion Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 267, 267, 305 (2001) (concluding
that "jurors are more influenced by clinical opinion expert testimony than by actuarial expert
testimony" and that the adversarial process fails to counter this bias); Edens et al., supra note 16, at
81 (arguing that, because poor expert testimony is obscured by "guise of science," "mental health
professionals should assume the responsibility to self-censor from proffering conclusions that are
empirically and ethically questionable") (citingJohn F. Edens et al., Pgychopathy and the Death Penaly:
Can the Pgichopathy Checkhst-Revised Identify Offenders who Represent "a Continuing Threat to Sodety"?, 29
J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433 (2001)).
137. Methodological errors in violence prediction also limit the defense team in a less visible
manner. Often, a court appointed mental health expert for the defense will state that he cannot
testify regarding future dangerousness because, based upon the defendant's record, he has con-
cluded that the defendant will pose a threat of violence. As discussed below, such determinations
are fraught with error. See infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of
expert testimony that does not rely on risk assessment tools).
138. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 23; see Edens et al., supra note 16, at 81 (summa-
rizing the previously discussed study of 155 Texas inmates and noting that "only 5% of capital
defendants predicted by experts to constitute 'continuing threats to society' in fact committed
subsequent serious acts of violence in prison over a relatively long follow-up period").
139. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 76.
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opposite direction to that reported."'" For example, it would seem to make
sense that the defendant who has committed a more severe or more violent
crime "on the street" would pose a greater risk of violence to others once
imprisoned. In fact, however, severity of offense is a surprisingly unreliable
predictor of violent behavior in prison. 41 As reported in one National Institute
of Corrections publication, "the severity of the instant offense has rarely been
found to be a very useful predictor of disciplinary adjustment.'
42
In a 1990 study by Robert P. Cooper and Paul D. Werner, two groups of
correctional professionals used demographic and biographical variables to
predict violence during the early months of prison incarceration. 4 3 Both groups'
forecasts exhibited poor predictive reliability.'" When explaining their future
dangerousness determinations, the professionals, both psychologists and case
managers, "consistently emphasized current offense, severity of current offense,
and history of violence, none of which were significantly correlated with actual
inmate violence."' 45 Conversely, they relied minimally on factors, such as age,
that have been empirically linked to violence.'"
Another common error is over-reliance on the clinical interview. 47 Clinical
assessments of violence that are based primarily on the client interview are
limited by the narrow and skewed portion of the population to which the
individual clinician has been exposed. 148 In addition, "[r]arely do clinicians gather
systematic feedback regarding the accuracy of their past judgements, resulting in
growing confidence over time entirely unrelated to any increase in accuracy. "149
In other words, because clinicians rarely if ever track their predictions for
accuracy and therefore do not alter the bases for their assessments over time,
140. Id.; see MONAHAN, supra note 10, at 62-64 (discussing the susceptibility of clinical
predictions to illusory correlation).
141. Cunningham & Reidy, sapra note 18, at 26-27.
142. ALEXANDER & AUSTIN, supra note 27, at 25.
143. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 76 (citing Robert P. Cooper & Paul D. Werner,
Predicting Violence in Newly Admitted Inmates: A Lens ModelAnalsis of Staff Dedsion Making, 17




147. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 28-29. Additional criticisms of clinical assess-
ments include the misapplication of psychological testing, crediting faulty implications of antisocial
personality disorder and psychopathy, ignoring the effects of aging, failure to define the severity of
the violence, failure to consider context and perhaps most importantly, inadequate reliance on base
rates. Id. at 23-31.




their dangerousness judgements are likely to rest upon factors which poorly
predict or do not predict future acts of violence in prison."' 0
Mental health experts commit these same errors in Virginia capital cases
today." ' Clinical forensic psychologists, testifying on behalf of the prosecution,
continue to rely upon factors that do not reliably predict future violence. Dr.
Arthur Centor, a clinical forensic psychologist, has testified in at least ten capital
cases that resulted in sentences of death. 5 2 In Wright v. Commonwealth,'53 Centor
based a prediction of future dangerousness on an examination of the defendant
including the defendant's social history.'54 Centor concluded that "there is a high
probability that [Wright] would, in the future, commit acts that are criminal,
violent and a danger to society."' Similarly, in Edmonds v. Commonwealth,'56
Centor testified that "there are strong indications that there is a high probability
of future dangerousness."'5 7 He reached that conclusion afer considering "an
evaluation of the defendant's record of criminal convictions, presentencing
reports... testimony at the guilt trial, the defendant's statements to the police,
and the autopsy report."'5 8  He later reaffirmed his determination after
conducting a two-hour interview with the defendant. 9
150. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 76.
151. Despite the United States Supreme Court holdings in Daubert v. Merre//DowParmaeutikals
and Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmicbael, which"ultimately may have a constraining effect on the use of
clinical predictions of violence risk in capital cases, at present these predictions continue relatively
unabated." Edens et al., spra note 16, at 57. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579,
587 (1993) (concluding that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide the standard for admitting
expert scientific testimony in a federal trial); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141
(1999) (holding that, under Daubert, a court's gatekeeping function applies to testimony based on
"technical" and "other specialized" knowledge as well as "scientific" knowledge).
152. See, e.g., Swann v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 195, 201 (Va. 1994) (noting that the
Commonwealth's case in chief included evidence of Swann's future dangerousness, through the
direct examination of Dr. Centor); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 394, 408 (Va. 1993)
(upholding the admission of Dr. Centor's testimony that Stewart would pose a future danger "based
on the circumstances of these cases, Stewart's prior criminal record, and the results of Stewart's
psychological tests"); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254, 265 (Va. 1991) (noting that "Dr.
Centor examined Yeatts pursuant to court order and reported Yeatts posed 'a probability of future
dangerousness' "); Savino v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276,281 (Va. 1990) (discussing testimony
by Dr. Centor that Savino "show[ed] signs of future dangerousness in view of his past criminal
history so that he would have a high probability of committing criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society in the future').
153. 427 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1993).
154. Wright v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 379, 391 (Va. 1993).
155. Id.
156. 329 S.E.2d 807 (Va. 1985).
157. Edmonds, 329 S.E.2d at 813.
158. Id.
159. Id. A survey of future dangerousness cases in Virginia suggests that the Commonwealth's
reliance on expert testimony like that offered by Dr. Centor is waning. Nonetheless, jurors will
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Despite the unreliable and inaccurate nature of this and similar mental
health testimony, when faced with challenges to the sufficiency of such future
dangerousness evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia has routinely
emphasized that the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's prior
history alone are sufficient to support a future dangerousness finding."6 These
rulings mean that a future dangerousness finding in Virginia could stand,
regardless of whether the court admitted unreliable clinical predictive testimony.
Given the natural tendency by jurors to overestimate prison violence in the
absence of statistical base rate data, the capital jury will again err on the side of
sentencing the defendant to death.
B. Dispelling the Notion that Actuarial Risk Assessment is Not Individuaized
The capital sentencing process needs an alternative and objective resource
to assist jurors in assessing a capital offender's potential to commit violent acts
while incarcerated. Actuarial tools have consistently proven more accurate than
clinical predictions.'6 1  Although actuarial risk assessment tools rely on
statistically analyzed group data in order to counter errors in human judgement,
the tools are not without detractors. Critics argue that because actuarial
techniques rely on group based statistics, they are not sufficiently individualized
to satisfy the tailored inquiry required to assess the likelihood that a specific
defendant will commit future violent acts. 6 In fact, "the distinction between
individualized as opposed to group methods is a false dichotomy.' ' 163 As William
M. Grove and Paul E. Meehl have noted, the search for a truly individualized
determination of risk "receives illegitimate, fallacious weight from an assumption
that... the statistics give mere probabilities, average results, or aggregate pro-
continue to overestimate the incidence of assaultive behavior in prison based upon the Common-
wealth's non-expert evidence of future dangerousness. Accordingly, the need for reliable base rate
testimony remains.
160. See supra Part III.A (discussing the evidence sufficient to support a finding of future
dangerousness in Virginia).
161. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 12, at 72; see William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl,
Comparative Efficieng- of Informal (Subjective, Impresionist) and Formal (Mechanical, Agon'thmic) Prediction
Procedures: The Chnical-Staistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 293, 296-99 (1996)
(presenting meta-analysis of studies on risk prediction and concluding the majority of studies favor
actuarial methods); MONAHAN, supra note 10, at 57-67 (discussing common errors in clinical
prediction, including vagueness in specifying the severity of violence, disregard of statistical base
rates, reliance on weak or nonexistent correlations, and failure to incorporate contextual consider-
ations). Seegeneralb PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETI-
CAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (Univ.of Minn. 1954) (discussing the strengths
and weaknesses of both the actuarial and clinical predictive methods and concluding that the
actuarial method is more accurate and is the soundest way to ensure the accuracy of clinical
predictive methods).
162. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 121, at 519.
163. Id. at 517.
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portions, whereas in dealing with the unique individual one will know exactly
what will befall that person. Of course, such a claim can almost never be
made."
164
The fact is that allscientifically derived expertise is based upon research on
various groups and animals. 65 That is, any evaluation by a professional,
including risk assessment, is derived from collective data based on specific
groups in a particular context.1 66 Whether the risk assessment is clinical or
actuarial, the process involves application of group data to an individual.67 A
predictive assertion of violence made according to observations from a clinical
interview necessarily relies-if it relies on anything-upon previous observations
of a group of persons with similar characteristics and an increased occurrence of
violence in the same context.16 Similarly, actuarial risk assessment techniques
identify variables that are predictive of future violence. 169 These "risk factors"
attributable to an individual defendant are then interpreted according to the rate
of violence among an experimental sample with the same set of characteristics. 7 °
A full response to the argument that probabilities are irrelevant to the
unique individual is beyond that scope of this article. However, a hypothetical
may be illustrative. As modified from a situation presented by Grove and Meehl,
consider the following.' 7 1 Your sister suffers from a debilitating illness. Her
physician informs you that she may have a chance for relief in an experimental
surgery performed by surgeon Y. Because your sister is in poor health and in no
condition to decide upon a course of treatment, you must decide for her. What
questions do you ask the physician? Most likely, you would ask: "What are the
chances for success?" "Is there a possibility that she might not survive the
surgery?" You would probably not respond well if the physician told you that
your questions were meaningless because your sister is unique and therefore no
one can really say how the surgery will affect her. What you want to hear and
expect instead is that the surgery is successful at the hands of surgeon Y 90%0 of
the time or 15% of the time. With that information, and knowledge of your
sister's particular condition, you can make an informed decision. The numbers
164. Grove & Meehl, smpra note 161, at 305.
165. Cunningham & Reidy, spra note 121, at 517-18.
166. Id. at 518.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 518-19.
170. Id. at 519.
171. See Grove & Meehl, supra note 161, at 305 (proposing a similar hypothetical in rebuttal
to critics of actuarial methods who claim that "statistical predictionists aggregate, whereas we seek




do not tell you with certainty that your sister will or will not survive. But they
provide you with the information you need to make your determination. 7 '
Analogizing to the capital sentencing proceeding, statistical risk assessment
evidence does not provide a yes-or-no answer to the question of whether "there
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.""' That is fortune
telling, and the dangers of such Grigson-like testimony are well-documented.7
However, risk assessment does provide the relative likelihood of an event in
probabilistic terms.'75 As Cunningham notes
The distinction between prediction and assessment is more than
simply semantics .... Probabilistic estimates keep the focus on the
data as opposed to emotional reasoning, untestable assumptions, and
dueling conclusionary testimony of competing experts. Probabilistic
estimates communicate that serious violence among capital offenders
in prison... are low base rate behaviors and are not exhibited by the
majority of capital offenders. Most importantly, the concept of
relative likelihood provides more information to the court than a
dichotomous prediction, allowing the trier of fact to apply the best
available data and methods to what is ultimately a social consideration
of what degree of violence risk is acceptable.' 
76
Given the increasing reliability of actuarial risk assessment techniques, a capital
jury deserves no less when deciding upon the appropriateness of an irrevocable
sentence.1
77
In fact, Cunningham and Reidy reported that, at the federal level, courts
regularly admit statistically analyzed base rate evidence. 17  Between the 1994
enactment of the Federal Death Penalty Act and 2002, at least fifty federal death
penalty trials proceeded to the sentencing phase.1 79  Mental health experts
testified using group statistical methods in no fewer than eighteen of these
federal death penalty cases.'" The testimony usually included base rate data
172. Id.
173. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 18, at 34 (noting that "[vliolence risk assessment in any
context involves an estimate of likelihood, not a dichotomous prediciton").
174. See id., at 34 ("Clinicians continue to confuse crystal balls with science at capital sentenc-
ing, undertaking predictions of violence rather than assessments of risk.").
175. Id.
176. Id. at 34-35.
177. See Eric S. Janus, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuragy,
Admissibii0 andAccountabi0, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1345 (2003) (noting that courts should
adopt state-of-the-art risk assessment methods, especially in light of empirical data suggesting the
predictive superiority of actuarial over clinical assessments).
178. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 121, at 514.
179. Id.
180. Id. In 2000, Steven Kiersh argued that in order to combat the government's claim that
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regarding prison populations used "as risk assessment anchoring points
regarding the likelihood that a federal capital defendant would commit acts of
serious violence while service a life-without-parole sentence in federal prison."'81
In six of the eighteen cases, the Government also presented testimony regarding
violence risk assessment, usually in rebuttal.'82 Notably, the Government's
testimony did not dispute the methodology of the defense's reliance on statistical
evidence or the data offered.'
18 3
C Constitutional Implications of the Current Future Dangerousness
Determination in Virginia
Our now not-so-naive observer has probably realized that there is a serious
problem with the future dangerousness inquiry in Virginia. He knows that the
tools that the Supreme Court of Virginia has provided the jury are not suitable
to the task assigned to them. Virginia requires juries to consider facts with little
relevance to future behavior in prison-the nature of the crime and the
defendant's prior history-and has thus far failed to provide basic information
about the behavior of similarly situated murders or the conditions under which
the defendant on trial will live out his life if spared.' Without this objective
information regarding prison life and actual rates of prison violence, the jury is
playing a proverbial game of pin the tale on the donkey. Blindfolded, members
of the jury attempt to fulfill their role as arbiters of the appropriate sentence.
Nonetheless, given the jury's natural propensity to overestimate recidivism and
assaultive behavior in prison, the sentencing proceeding is weighted in favor of
a sentence of death.
Taken together, these considerations implicate a fundamental constitutional
concern. As a matter of federal constitutional law, a capital defendant has a right
to present a complete defense and more specifically, to meet the Common-
wealth's claim that he will pose a future danger to society.' This "right of
rebuttal," guaranteed by due process, derives directly from the rule of Gardner v.
a client is so violent that he must be executed to prevent future violent acts, defense counsel "must
introduce expert testimony from a penal expert and statistician." Steven R. Kiersh, How to Use and
Combat Experts in Federal Death Penalty Cases, 2 ASS'N TRIAL LAW. AM. ANN. CONVENTION
REFERENCE MATERIALS 1793 (2002), WL 2 Ann.2000 ATLA-CLE 1793.
181. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 121, at 514.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 515.
184. See supra Part III.A-B (analyzing the Supreme Court of Virginia's future dangerousness
jurisprudence).
185. The United States Supreme Court has held that "one of the hallmarks of due process in
our adversary system is the defendant's ability to meet the State's case against him." O'Dell v.
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151,169 (1997) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (holding
that a capital defendant has a right to present a "complete defense")).
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Florida,186 which held that due process is violated when a defendant is sentenced
to death "on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or
explain."
' 8 7
Simmons v. South Carolina'88 applied this rule to future dangerousness assess-
ments in capital sentencing."8 9 Pursuant to Simmons, if the prosecution argues
that a parole-ineligible defendant poses a future danger to society, the defendant
is entitled to a"life-means-life" instruction informing the jury of his parole-
ineligible status. 9 ° In Simmons, the prosecution urged the jury to consider the
defendant's future dangerousness in determining the proper sentence.' 9 ' In
response, prior to the penalty phase jury deliberations, defense counsel requested
a jury instruction to clarify that "life imprisonment" in the defendant's case did
not carry the possibility of parole. 192 In other words, to rebut the prosecution's
claim of future dangerousness, defense counsel sought to inform the jury that
any potential for danger would necessarily be confined to the prison setting.' 93
The trial court rejected the requested instruction.
194
The United States Supreme Court held that denial of the instruction
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Court
accepted the defendant's premise that the jury could reasonably have believed
that he might be released on parole if not given a death sentence. 96 This
186. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
187. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
188. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
189. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,169 (1994) (plurality opinion) (holding that
due process requires that a capital jury be informed that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment
will not be eligible for parole).
190. Id. at 178 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Where the State puts the defendant's future
dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment
without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing
jury-by either argument or instruction-that he is parole ineligible." Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2004) (providing for a life-means-life instruction at the defendant's request);
Yarbrough, 519 S.E.2d at 616 (holding that in all capital cases the trial court, upon the defendant's
request, must instruct the jury that life imprisonment means life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole).
191. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 157.
192. Id. at 158-60.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 159-60. When the jury later sent a note to the judge from the deliberation room
asking, "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?" the trial judge
responded with the following instruction: "You are instructed not to consider parole or parole
eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That is not a proper
issue for your consideration. The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood
in theirplan [sic] and ordinary meaning." Id. at 160.
195. Id. at 162; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
196. In Simmons, defense counsel, at oral argument, presented the results of a statewide public-
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"misunderstanding" created "a false choice between sentencing petitioner to
death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration" after which he
stood to be released into free society to kill again.'97 The Simmons Court
responded to this dilemma by holding, as the Court would later reiterate in Sbafer
v. South Carolina, 9 ' that when "a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at
issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life
imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entities the defendant
'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility.' 199
Notably, the right of rebuttal established by Simmons is based upon a
recognition of the critical importance of context to any dangerousness
determination. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence, the prosecution
in Simmons told the jury, "[y]our verdict should be a response of society to
someone who is a threat. ' '200 Simmons's response was that his criminal history
involved only elderly women, a group with which he would not have contact
behind bars; this claim "stood a chance of succeeding, if at all, only if the jury
were convinced that petitioner would stay in prison." '' In other words, the
jury's future dangerousness decision rested upon a distinction between the risk
Simmons posed in society at large, and the much-reduced risk he posed in the
restrictive prison setting.
Not surprisingly, in determining whether death is the appropriate sentence,
capital juries place great emphasis on the prosecution's assertions of future
dangerousness. 2 That much is clear from Simmons, and the questions proposed
opinion survey. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 159. Only 7% of jury-eligible adults believed that life
imprisoned inmates would spend the rest of their lives in prison. Id. Nearly 75% of those surveyed
believed that a convicted murderer would be paroled in less than thirty years. Id. Finally, more than
three-quarters indicated that, if asked to make a capital sentencing decision, the number of years the
defendant would actually spend behind bars would be an "extremely important" or a "very impor-
tant" factor in deciding between a sentence of life and death. Id.
197. Id. at 161.
198. 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
199. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168-69; Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39 (2001) (quoting
Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
200. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 176 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Id. (emphasis in original).
202. See Aletha M. Claussen-Schultz et al., Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and CapitalSentendng,
10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 471, 480-82 (2004) (presenting studies of capital juries in which
jurors expressed concern about and substantially discussed the defendant's potential for violent
behavior if returned to society);John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in CapitalCases:Always 'At
Issue", 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 404 (2001) (concluding that juror deliberations on the issue of
future dangerousness to society overshadowed jury discussions on all other issues except the crime
itself; Stephen P. Garvey & Paul Marcus, Virginia's Capital Jurors, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2063,
2089-98 (2003) (reaching conclusions about Virginia's capital jurors analogous to those reached by
John H. Blume et al. in South Carolina).
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by the jury to the trial court in Simmons and Shafer illustrate this reliance. 3 For
example, the Simmons jury asked the trial judge to answer one question: "Does
the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?'2"' The
question highlighted the capital jury's general misunderstanding of the term "life
imprisonment. '205  The Simmons Court took notice of the common-sense
implication that "many jurors might not know whether a life sentence carries
with it the possibility of parole." 206 Similarly, in Shafer, the jury deliberated for
three and one-half hours before submitting two questions for resolution: "1) Is
there any remote chance for someone convicted of murder to become elig[ijble
for parole?" and "2) Under what conditions would someone convicted for
murder be elig[i]ble?"2 7 The Supreme Court directly addressed this issue when
it held that a capital defendant has a due process right, when future
dangerousness is at issue, to inform the jury that the defendant is ineligible for
parole.
20 8
Questions by jurors also indicate that sentencers want to know more about
the specific prison conditions that might affect the defendant's potential for
violence in prison. For example, in Rbines v. Weber,2° a capital case in South
Dakota, the jury came back with numerous questions for the court including. (1)
"Will [the defendant] be allowed to mix with the general inmate population?"
and (2) "Will [the defendant] be jailed alone or will he have a cell mate?"21 As
discussed above, answers to questions such as these can be of critical importance
to the jury's ability to assess the defendant's capacity to commit future violent
acts in prison. It necessarily follows that absent the right to provide such
information, the defendant's ability to present a complete defense and to rebut
the prosecution's future dangerousness case is severely curtailed.
The constitutional importance of a full and fair determination of a
defendant's dangerousness has been heightened by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona.2 ' Ring invalidated Arizona's capital sen-
tencing scheme to the extent that it allowed statutory aggravating factors to be
found by a judge rather than a jury, and by a standard of less than beyond a
203. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160; Shaer, 532 U.S. at 44.
204. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160.
205. Id. at 177-78 (O'Connor,J., concurring). "[T]hat the jury in this case felt compelled to
ask whether parole was available shows that the jurors did not know whether or not a life-sentenced
defendant will be released from prison." Id. at 178.
206. Id.
207. Sbafer, 532 U.S. at 44.
208. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168-69.
209. 608 N.W. 2d 303 (S.D. 2000).
210. Rhines v. Weber, 608 N.W.2d 303, 310 (S.D. 2000).
211. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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reasonable doubt.212 Relying on its earlier decision inApprendi v. NewJersqy,2' the
Court held that, "[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as
'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury" and therefore, proven beyond
a reasonable doubt."1 4 Thus, after Ring, future dangerousness is effectively an
element of the aggravated crime of capital murder for which the death sentence
is possible, and the defendant's right of rebuttal as to future dangerousness is not
merely similar to, but identical to, the due process right of any criminal defendant
to mount a defense to each element of the offense charged.215
Together, these cases establish a constitutional right to present objective
evidence upon which a jury can rely in deciding whether the death-eligible
"element" of future dangerousness has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Without this information, jurors are likely to fill in the gaps, erroneously,
between the defendant's violent past and a presumed violent future. That leap
is unsubstantiated by current knowledge regarding risk assessment, and this
potentially irrevocable and correctable error must be avoided.
V. Conclusion
The issue of whether a sentence of death should turn on a finding of future
dangerousness has long been the subject of debate. Nonetheless, Virginia long
ago chose the path of violence prediction by explicitly adopting future
dangerousness as a statutory aggravating factor.216 After almost thirty years of
sentencing and executing capital offenders based in whole or in part on a jury
finding of future dangerousness, the process by which Virginia establishes
dangerousness is overdue for a critical assessment.
As this article has shown, it is much easier to predict that a given convicted
murderer will be violent in the future than it is to make such a prediction and be
correct. Given the unreliable nature of mental health testimony that is not
grounded in statistical evidence, it is time for Virginia courts and the Virginia
defense bar to recognize that risk assessment tools have a role to play in the
future dangerousness determination at capital sentencing.
212. Id. at 609.
213. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
214. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000));
seeApprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (holding that any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
215. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
216. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (prohibiting a jury from imposing a
sentence of death in a capital murder case unless it finds "there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman").
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With the abolition of parole, the Virginia General Assembly enacted, and
in fact mandated, a non-corporal alternative to a sentence of death: life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. However, if jurors are not
informed of the true nature of prison life and prison violence by capital
offenders, they will continue to impose sentences of death when they otherwise
might sentence the defendant to die in prison. Absent the basic risk assessment
information discussed in this article, a capital jury cannot reliably select death
over life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as the appropriate
punishment.
In addition, without the basic facts regarding the operation of the penal
system, the jury lacks the evidentiary basis upon which to serve its fundamental
role of "maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system.' '217 Because of the operation of this "link" over time, certain
severe punishments once imposed have now disappeared from the criminal
justice system. In 1789, on the floor of the First Congress, Representative
Livermore proclaimed as certain that "villains often deserve whipping, and
perhaps having their ears cut off."2 t8 However, whippings and mutilation would
undoubtedly be "cruel and unusual" today. 1 9 Punishments such as public
flogging disappeared, not only because they fell out of favor in the abstract, but
also because society developed a practical and superior alternative, namely long-
term imprisonment."2 Had sentencers been kept in the dark about the new non-
corporal alternative, however, they certainly would have continued to impose the
now antiquated sentences.
Similarly, when states conceal essential information about the true nature
of an alternative punishment to death, they obstruct the historic process by
which our society replaces one form of punishment with another. Once Virginia
made the choice to adopt life without parole as a uniquely severe and incapacitive
alternative to the death penalty, it acquired a constitutional and moral obligation
not to distort the sentencing process by denying sentencing juries the infor-
mation necessary to accurately assess the adequacy of that punishment.
217. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
218. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 262 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting I
ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
219. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
220. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 74-76
(Basic Books 1993) (discussing the rejection of whipping and mutilation with the development of
an effective alternative, imprisonment).
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